The behavior of solutions to bargaining problems on the basis of solidarity by Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
The behavior of solutions to bargaining problems on
the basis of solidarity






RightDiscussion Paper Series A No.474
The Behavior of Solutions to Bargaining
Problems on the Basis of Solidarity
Yongsheng Xu




(The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University)
January 2006
The Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603 JapanThe Behavior of Solutions to Bargaining
Problems on the Basis of Solidarity∗
Yongsheng Xu
Department of Economics
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University









This version: December 2005
∗ We are grateful to William Thomson for comments on an earlier draft
of the paper.
11 Introduction
A persistent question asked in axiomatic bargaining problems is the follow-
ing: when bargaining problems change from A to B, how should solutions to
them respond? Many of the axioms in the axiomatic bargaining literature
are of this type. Among them, the most prominent ones are perhaps Nash’s
IIA (1950) and Kalai’s Monotonicity (1977). Though they have been used
mainly for understanding and characterizing diﬀerent solutions to bargaining
problems, a moment’s reﬂection may convince us that they all have one thing
in common: they are types of a broad class of axioms that may be called
solidarity. The main idea underlying a solidarity-type axiom is that, when
bargaining problems change from A to B, the “utility gains” by any two
players should not be in opposite directions: if one player gains from moving
A to B, then no player should become worse oﬀ from such a move; and if
one player loses from moving A to B,t h e nn op l a y e rs h o u l dg a i nf r o ms u c h
a move. The solidarity-type axioms have been fruitfully studied in the liter-
ature on fair allocations (see, for example, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999)).
In the standard bargaining model, on the other hand, there exists little such
systematic studies on solutions to bargaining problems based explicitly on the
idea of solidarity.1 In this paper, we oﬀer such a systematic study of the ax-
ioms based on solidarity for standard bargaining problems. As a by-product,
we present alternative characterizations of some well-known solutions. Our
alternative characterizations will provide a further understanding of the be-
havior of solutions to bargaining problems in terms of solidarity.
2B a s i c M o d e l
The set of players is denoted by N = {1,2,...,n} where n ≥ 2.W e u s e
R+ to denote the set of all non-negative real numbers, while Rn
+ is used to
denote the n-fold Cartesian product of R+.F o r e a c h x,y ∈ Rn
+,w ew r i t e
x ≥ y as [xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N], x > y as [xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and x 6= y],
and x À y as [xi >y i for all i ∈ N].
Let π be a permutation of N.F o r e a c h x =( xi)i∈N ∈ Rn
+,l e tπ(x)=
(xπ(i))i∈N.L e tΠ be the set of all permutations of N.
1Yoshihara (2003, 2005) discusses axiomatic characterizations of bargaining solutions
in terms of solidarity in a speciﬁc model of production economies.
2Let B be the set of all compact, convex, and comprehensive subsets of Rn
+,
each of which contains an interior point of Rn
+.E l e m e n t si nB are interpreted
as normalized (bargaining) problems.F o r e a c h A ∈ B and each π ∈ Π,l e t
π(A)={π(a) | a ∈ A}.F o r e a c h A ∈ B, A is a symmetric problem if
A = π(A) for all π ∈ Π.
For each A ∈ B and each i ∈ N,l e tmi(A)=m a x {ai | (a1,···,a i,···,a n) ∈
A}. Therefore, m(A) ≡ (mi(A))i∈N is the ideal point of A.
For each x ∈ Rn
+ and α ∈ Rn
++,l e tα(x) ≡ (αixi)i∈N.G i v e nA ∈ B and
α ∈ Rn
++,l e tα(A) ≡
©
α(x) ∈ Rn
+ | x ∈ A
ª
.F o r e a c h A in Rn
+,w ed e ﬁne





+ | ∃x ∈ A : z ≤ x
ª
.
Let the convex hull of A be denoted by conA.
A solution F is a single-valued mapping from B to Rn
+ such that for every
problem A ∈ B, F (A) ∈ A.F o rg i v e nF (A) ∈ A,l e tFi (A) ∈ R+ be its i-th
component. The following three are well-known solutions.
Nash Solution FNA: For every A ∈ B, FNA(A)=a r gm a x (a1,...,an)∈A
Q
i∈N ai.
Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution FKS: For every A ∈ B, FKS(A) ∈ A
implies that: (1) there is no other a ∈ A such that a À FKS(A); and (2)
there exists γ ∈ (0,1) such that FKS(A)=γ · m(A).
Egalitarian Solution FE: For every A ∈ B, FE(A) ∈ A implies that: (1)
there is no other a ∈ A such that a À FE(A); and (2) FE
i (A)=FE
j (A) for
all i,j ∈ N.
3A x i o m s a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n s
We group axioms into two categories: non-solidarity type and solidarity type.
We consider ﬁrst the non-solidarity type. They are fairly standard in the
literature on convex problems (see, for example, Peters (1992) and Thomson
(1994) for discussions).
Eﬃciency (E): For each A ∈ B,t h e r ei sn ox ∈ A such that x >F(A).
Weak Eﬃciency (WE): For each A ∈ B,t h e r ei sn ox ∈ A such that
x À F (A).
3Symmetry (S): For each A ∈ B,i fA is symmetric, then Fi (A)=Fj (A)
for all i,j ∈ N.
Scale Invariance (SI): For all A,B ∈ B,a n de a c hα ∈ Rn
++,i fB = α(A),
then F (B)=α(F (A)).
Next, we turn to solidarity type axioms.
Solidarity (SOL): For all A,B ∈ B, either F(A) À F(B) or F(B) À
F(A) or F(A)=F(B).
Restricted Solidarity (RSOL): For all A,B ∈ B with m(A)=m(B),
either F(A) À F(B) or F(B) À F(A) or F(A)=F(B).
Weak Solidarity (WSOL): For all A,B ∈ B, either F(A) ≥ F(B) or
F(B) ≥ F(A).
Contraction Independence (CI): For each A,B ∈ B,i fA ⊆ B and
F (B) is eﬃcient on A,t h e nF (B)=F (A).
Restricted Contraction Independence (RCI): For each A,B ∈ B such
that m(A)=m(B),i f A ⊆ B and F (B) is eﬃcient on A,t h e nF (B)=
F (A).
Expansion Independence (EI): For each A,B ∈ B,i f A ⊆ B and F (A)
is eﬃcient on B,t h e nF (B)=F (A).
Restricted Expansion Independence (REI): For each A,B ∈ B such
that m(A)=m(B),i f A ⊆ B and F (A) is eﬃcient on B,t h e nF (B)=
F (A).
(SOL) is the most general form of a solidarity-type axiom. It requires
that, whenever bargaining problems change from A to B,e i t h e rF(A) À
F(B) or F(B) À F(A) or F(A)=F(B), meaning that if one player gains
(loses) as a result from the move, every player gains (loses) as well. (RSOL)
is a restricted version of (SOL). (WSOL) conveys the same idea as (SOL) in a
weak form in which, when bargaining problems change from A to B, it should
be the case in which no player’s gain is at the expense of some other player’s
loss. It may be noted that these three axioms are new in the literature. (CI)
4and (RCI) each deal with situations where a bargaining problem A shrinks
to another problem B. (CI) requires that, when a problem B shrinks to
another problem A, if the solution to B is eﬃcient on A,t h e nF(B) should
continue to be the solution to A. The solidarity idea embedded in the axiom
is that, given that F(B) is eﬃcient on A, any movement away from F(B) will
make at least one player worse oﬀ, and as a consequence, to keep the spirit
of solidarity, F(B) should continue to be the solution to A. It may be noted
that (CI) is formally slightly weaker than Nash’s IIA (1950), and also that
(RCI) is formally slightly weaker than Restricted IIA proposed by Yu (1973).
On the other hand, (EI) and (REI) each deal with situations involving the
expansion of bargaining problems from A to B. For example, (EI) requires
that, when a problem A is enlarged to another problem B,i ft h es o l u t i o n
F(A) to A is eﬃcient on B,t h e nF(A) should continue to be the solution
to the problem B. The idea is that, even though there is an enlargement
of “opportunities” from A to B,g i v e nt h a tF(A) is both eﬃcient on A and
on B,a n dt h a tF(A) is already the solution to the original problem A,a n y
movement away from F(A) will hurt at least one player, and thus the solution
to the enlarged problem B should continue to be F(A).T h i sr e q u i r e m e n ti s
consistent with the solidarity idea embedded in the solution. The property
can also be seen as stating a certain inertia of the choice process. (REI) is
weaker than (EI) in that it restricts its applicability to situations where the
ideal point remains unchanged.
The following proposition summarizes the logical relationships between
and/or among the solidarity-type axioms discussed above. The proof is sim-
ple and we leave it to the reader.
Proposition 1. (i) (SOL) ⇒ (RSOL) and (WSOL); (ii) (SOL) + (WE) ⇒
(CI), (RCI), (EI), and (REI); (iii) (RSOL) + (WE) ⇒ (RCI) and (REI); (iv)
(WSOL) + (E) ⇒ (CI) ⇒ (RCI); (v) (WSOL) + (E) ⇒ (EI) ⇒ (REI).
4 Results and Their Proofs
This section presents our main results and their proofs follow.
Theorem 1: The following statements are equivalent: (1.i) F = FE; (1.ii)
F satisﬁes (WE), (S), (CI) and (EI); (1.iii) F satisﬁe s( W E ) ,( S ) ,( S O L ) .
Proof. We ﬁrst establish the equivalence of (1.i) and (1.ii). It can be checked
5that FE satisﬁe s( W E ) ,( S ) ,( C I )a n d( E I ) .W en o ws h o wt h a ti fF satisﬁes
(WE), (S), (CI) and (EI), then F = FE.
Let F be a solution satisfying (WE), (S), (CI) and (EI). By non-emptiness
of F and (WE), we need only to show the following
For each A ∈ B,e a c hx and a that are weakly eﬃcient in A,i f
[ai = aj for all i,j ∈ N], but [xi 6= xj for some i,j ∈ N], then x 6= F(A).
Let x and a be such that both are weakly eﬃcient on A,[ ai = aj for all
i,j ∈ N], and [xi 6= xj for some i,j ∈ N]. Suppose to the contrary that
x = F (A).C o n s i d e rB ≡ comp{x}.N o t et h a tB ⊆ A.B y( C I ) ,x = F (B).
Consider the set con[∪π∈Ππ(B)], and denote it by C. By construction,
C is a symmetric convex set having C ⊇ B. By the construction of B and
C, x is eﬃcient on C. Therefore, noting that x = F(B), B ⊆ C and x is
eﬃcient on C, x = F (C) follows from (EI). Since C is symmetric, by (WE)
and (S), F (C) must be weakly eﬃcient and be the equal utility point, which
is a contradiction. Therefore, x 6= F (A). This proves (1.ii) implies (1.i), and
thus the equivalence of (1.i) and (1.ii).
T oc o m p l e t et h ep r o o f ,w en o t et h a t ,FE satisﬁes (SOL), and that (SOL)
and (WE) imply (CI) and (EI). ¦
Theorem 2: The following statements are equivalent: (2.i) F = FKS; (2.ii)
F satisﬁes (WE), (S), (SI), (RCI) and (REI); (2.iii) F satisﬁes (WE), (S),
(SI) and (RSOL).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1 by noting
axiom (SI) and we leave it to the reader. ¦
Our characterizations of the egalitarian and the KS solutions are new.
Since we use variants of the solidarity-type axioms, our results oﬀer a new
perspective for these two solutions on the basis of solidarity. We also note
that the Nash solution can be characterized by our (CI), together with (E),
(S) and (SI). Since (CI) can be regarded as a solidarity-type axiom, the Nash
solution has a certain sense of solidarity. Among the three solutions, clearly,
the egalitarian solution fares the best in terms of solidarity since it can be
characterized by using the strongest form of the solidarity-type axioms.
It can be checked that the axioms in each of our characterizations of the
egalitarian solution are independent. The independence of the axioms (WE),
( S ) ,( S I )a n d( R S O L )i nc h a r a c t e r i z i n gt h eK - Ss o l u t i o nc a nb ec h e c k e d .F o r
#N>2,t h ea x i o m s( W E ) ,( S ) ,( S I ) ,( R C I )a n d( R E I )a r ei n d e p e n d e n t .I f ,
6however, #N =2 , then the K-S solution is characterized by (WE), (S), (SI)
and (REI). Thus, (RCI) is no longer indispensable to characterize the K-S
solution in two-person problems.
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